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0NE responsibility of the Federal Reserve System
is to promote sound banking practices. In recent
years this Federal bank regulator has been concerned
that some banks were tending to leave themselves
vulnerable to liquidity crises by concentrating a large
share of their time deposits in short maturities, par-
ticularly large certificates of deposit1. One tool that
the Board has used to counter this tendency has been
higher reserve requirements on short-term lime de-
posits than on longer maturity deposits. The latest
such Board action came in October 1975 and January
1976 when reserve requirements were reduced on
member hank time deposits with maturities of 180
days or more2.
In the aggregate, banks are likely to respond to
these policy actions by reducing the percentage of
time deposits held in maturities of less than 180 days.
However, since these policy actions are intended pri-
marily to reduce the vulnerability of banks to liquid-
ity crises, their success should be judged not only in
terms of aggregate maturity shifts, but also in terms
of effects ou the maturity structure of individual
banks. As indicated in the following analysis, these
reductions in reserve requirements are likely to have
effects on some individual member banks which are
t
The assumption that a bank is more vulnerable to liquidity
crises when its time deposits are concentrated in short matur-
ities can be illustrated in the following example. Assume that
a bank experiences a temporarily large decLne in the value of
its assets, for whatever reason. If its time deposits are con-
centrated in short-term maturities, the hank may be forced to
liquidate some of its less liquid assets ia order to meet its
current obligations, since it is unlikely that the bank could
attract additional deposits during the adjustment period. The
asset liquidation further reduces the bank’s net worth, which
aggravates its financial position and extends the period of
adjustment, thereby allowing time for more short-term time
deposits to reach maturity — a vicious circle which could re-
sult in a bank failure.
2
Federai Reserve Bulletin (October 1975), p. 705, and
(January 1976), p. 66.
opposite to those intended, It appears that only a
small portion of member banks in the Eighth District
are affected by these recent policy actions, and some
of the banks that are affected actually have incen-
tives to shorten the maturity structure of their time
deposits.
RECENT CHANGES IN RESERVE
REQUIREMENTS
Before the fall of 1974 the maturity structure of
bank time deposits was not influenced by differential
reserve requirements. The maturity structure of lime
deposits depended upon the maturity structure of
bank assets, interest rates on lime deposits of vari-
ous maturities, interest rate expectations, and interest
ceilings on deposits.
In September 1974 the Board removed marginal
reserve requirements on large certificates of deposit
(CDs) with initial maturities of 4 months or more,
leaving a marginal reserve requirement of 3 percent
on large Cs with initial maturities of less than
4 months.3 This action created a differential in re-
serve requirements which favored longer-term time
deposits. In December 1974 all marginal reserve
requirements on large CDs were removed and re-
serve requirements on 30-179 day lime deposits over
$5 million were raised to 6 percent, with reserve
3
Marginal reserve requirements on CDs of $100,000 and over
were imposed in June 1973. An extra (marginal) reserve
requirement of 3 percent (in addition to the 5 percent re-
serve requirement on time deposits in effect at that time)
applied to the amount of a bank’s large CDs above tbe
average amount it had outstanding in the week ending May
16, 1973, The marginal reserve requirements in effect until
December 1974 continued to apply to large CDs over the
average amount held in the week ending May 16, 1973, but
did not apply to banks with aggregate obligations less tban
$10 million. For more details, see the Federal Reserve
Bulletin (November 1974), p. 800.
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Table I
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS ON MEMBER BANK
T!ME DEPOSITS
In eftecl from October 1, 970 thro,jct, i~ecembe’ii, I c74
PcrcersI
~otegory of Deposits cf Depos.ts
Savings 3%
Other Time
F,rst $5 million 3
Over 55 mi”c.n 5
In effect In effett n effect
from from rince
12/12/74 to I 0/30/7.5 Jo’.’ia~y8,





First $5 million 333
Over $5 million 666
Initiai maturities of 1 80
days to four yeart ‘? 5
Initial maturities of four
years or over 3 1
tint’ and ~es .n,:, lu: ‘‘.t—:’’:u’t n’
nut Is, u’.’ th’...:t.u’u..ut f t..td un,e a’s’;’..’ I’,
requirements on all other time deposits set at 3 per-
cent (see Table I). The intended effect ‘f this policy
action was to induce banks to shift into obligations
of more than 179 days. This effect was realized as
the percentage of time deposits in maturities of 30-179
days declined steadily from December 1974 to Sep-
tember 1975.
The reserve requirement changes in October 1975
and January 1978 were designed to give banks even
greater incentives to lengthen the maturity structures
of their time deposits. Reserve requirements on time
deposits with initial maturities of 4 years and over
were reduced from 3 percent to 1 percent in October
1975, and in January 1976 reserve requirements on
time deposits with maturities of 180 days to 4 years
were reduced from 3 percent to 2.5 percent. Federal
Reserve regulations, however, state that a member
bank’s required reserves on total time and savings
deposits can be no less than 3 percent of its total
time and savings deposits. In other words, a member
bank’s required reserves on time deposits must equal
the amount based upon applying the relevant per-
centages to each category of time deposits or 3
percent of total time deposits, whichever is larger.
The 3 percent minimum is crucial for the following
analysis.
The two recent changes in reserve requirements
on time deposits (October 1975 and January 1976)
are analyzed in this note as one policy action in order
to consider their combined effects. The response of
an individual bank will depend on the maturity
structure of its time deposits at the time of the reserve
requirement change. Table II illustrates this situation
by dividing Eighth District banks into three groups
according to their time deposit maturity structure.
Member banks with less than $5 mfflion in 30-179
day time deposits have no incentive (from a reserve
requirement standpoint) to change their maturity
structure.4 For these banks, reserve requirements on
each maturity group of time deposits were set at
3 percent in December 1974 and are still effectively
3 percent on each maturity’ group because of the 3
percent minimum rule.
A second group of member banks has an incentive
to lengthen the maturity structure of time deposits.
Under the new reserve requirements, their required
reserves on total time deposits are greater than 3
percent because they have a relatively large propor-
tion of their time deposits in 30-179 day maturities.
These banks can decrease their total required reserves
by shifting a larger share of their time deposits to
longer maturities. The amount by which a bank in
this group can reduce its required reserves is still
limited by the 3 perceut minimum rule.3
A third group of member banks, on the other hand,
has an incentive to shift some time deposits to
shorter maturities, the opposite response to that which
was intended. Each of these banks had over $5 mil-
lion in 30-179 day time deposits, but their total re-
serve requirements on time deposits was the minimum
3 percent because they had a relatively large amount
of time deposits in longer maturitiesii
4
lixcept to the extent that they are discouraged from expand-
ing deposits of 30-179 day maturities beyond $5 million.
5
The condition required fnr a member bank’s average reserve
requirement on time deposits to be above 3 percent under the
new reserve requirements is given as follows:
Let S be a bank’s 30-179 day deposits
M be a bank’s 180 day - 4 year deposits
L be a bank’s deposits with maturities of 4 years
and over
(.03) $5 million + (.06) (S —$5 million) +
(.025) M + (.01) L > (.03) (S + L ±M)
The condition is equivalent to
(.03) (S—$Smillion) > (.02)L-f (.005) M
If, by lengthening the maturities of time deposits, these
inequalities become equalities, a bank’s average reserve re-
quirement on its time deposits becomes the minimum 3
percent.
°lJsingthe notation in footnote 5, the conditions required for
banks to be in this third group are as follows:
S -— $5 million > 0 and
(.02) L + (.005) M .03(S —$5 million)
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Table It
CHARACTERISTICS OF EIGHTH DISTRICT MEMBER BANKS WITH
DIFFERENT INCENTIVES TO CHANGE THE MATURITIES
OF THEIR TIME DEPOSITS
tncentiv st oChange Number of Fghth
Cha actoristics a Banks the Maturity Structure istrict Member Sceiks
Less than $5 million in No reserverequirement 349
30-179 day time deposits. advantage in changing the
maturity structure of time
deposit
More than $5 roil Ion in
30-179 day time deposits.
(al 30 179 day depos’ts tncentives to shift 30 179 day 53
in excess of $5 million time dope ‘ts to maturities of
greater than¾ of deposits over 179 days and shift
of4 years and over plus depos~ts0 180 day —‘ 4 year
16¾percent of 180 day maturities to maturities of4
4 year deposits1 average yea s and over
reserve requirement on time
deposits over 3 percent.
2
(b) 30 179 day deposits tncent yes to shift time deposits 27
n excess of $5 mittion toss to maturities of 30 179 day
than or equal a¾ of and possibly shift deposits to
deposits of4 years and over matur ties of 4 years and over
plus Io% percent of lao
day 4 year d posits;
average reserve requiresient
on time deposits at the 3
percent minimum Totot. 429
B ml pon zneunber bank time depos ta ia the serve settlement week ending Oe be,
22 1975.
These relation between tb maturity dsstrzb t on o ime deposits nd the Vera
reserve requirement of tune eposits demonstrated f the a of an aeage ee
r qusresn abor 3 percent Lot
S be a bank 30-179 day deposits
M be a banks 180 day 4 year deposits
L a bank depost ali maturities of 4 ears and ov
In this case.
(.0 1 35 mition + (.06) (S Siusi ion) (.0 n)M (.0t)L 015 (5 L Ml
this condition yields-
S million (,6667)L (15 71
When the recent changes in reserve requimements
went into effect, the proportions of time deposits
these banks had in short maturities are assumed to
be smaller than if reserve requirements had been
uniform on all maturities of time deposits. Under the
new reserve requirements, banks in the third group
can shift some deposits with maturities of over 179
days to maturities of 30-179 days without increasing
their total required reserves because of the 3 percent
minimumn rule. Therefore, for these banks the penalty’
on short-term time deposits imposed in December
1974 is effectively removed.7 However, all of these
statements about tendencies for banks to alter the
maturity structure of their time deposits must be
qualified to the extent that interest ceilings on time
deposits prevent banks from inducing their customers
to change maturities of deposits.
T
Some banks in this third group may also increase the propor-
tion of their time deposits with maturities of 4 years and
over in response to the recent changes in reserve require-
ments. Suppose banks in this third group increase their time
deposits in short maturities to the levels they would desire





Time deposits at member banks in the
Eighth District are examined to deter-
mine their incentives for changing the
maturity structure of their time de-
posits under the new reserve require-
ments. The deposits are for the week
ending October 22, 1975 — the first
week for which the reserve require-
ment change of October 1975 applies.5
Current reserve requirements are ap-
plied to those deposits to determine
whether reserve requirements on time
deposits would have been above or
equal to 3 percent of total time deposits.9
Of the 429 member banks in the
Eighth District, only 80 are affected by
the recent reserve requirement changes
(those with more than $5 million in 30-
179 day time deposits). The relevant
total reserve requirement on time de-
posits was the minimum 3 percent for 27
of those 80 banks and above 3 percent
deposits out of 180 day - 4 year maturity de-
posits. The average reserve requirements on
time deposits would be above 3 percent for
some of these banks; they could keep their
average reserve requirements on time deposits at the minimum
3 percent by also shifting deposits out of 180 day - 4 year de-
posits to maturities of 4 years and over.
SUnder lagged reserve requirements in effect since September
1968, required reserves of a member bank for each settlement
week (ending each Wednesday) are based upon its deposit
liabilities two weeks earlier. The deposit liabjities of a mem-
ber bank in the week ending October 22, 1975 determined its
required reserves for the settlement week of October 30
through November 5, 1975.
°Analternative approach would involve analyzing the implica-
tions of each change in reserve requirements using deposit
data for the first weeks to which each change in reserve
requirements apply. This approach would create problems
for determining the effects of the combined changes in re-
serve requirements on the incentives for bariks to change
the maturity structure of their tine deposits. Suppose, for
example, that by Januasy 1976 banks had made partial ad-
justments in the maturity stnictures of their time deposits
in response to the reserve requirement change in October
1975. In this situation there would be ambiguity as to the
number of banks that would have incentives to shift de-
posits to short maturities under the combined changes in
reserve requirements and the amount by which they could
shift deposits to short maturities without increasing their
required reserves. Some banks would have incentives to
lengthen the maturity structure of their time deposits under
the October 1975 change and shorten maturities under the
change in January 1976. These offsetting influences can be
netted out by applying the two changes to time deposit bal-
ances in the week ending October 22, 1975.
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For the other 53 banks. Therefore, only 53 member
banks in the Eighth District have incentives to
lengthen the maturity structure of their time de-
posits, while 27 actually have incentives to shift de-
posits to maturities of 30-179 days.1°
Total deposits of banks that have incentives to
shift time deposits to short maturities range from
about $18 million to $130 million. Table III gives
information on the extent to which these banks can
shift deposits to short maturities without increasing
their required reserves. Note that 10 banks can in-
crease their short-term deposits by more than 50
percent, and of these 10, 3 can more than double
their short-term deposits without increasing their total
required reserves. These 27 banks can increase their
30-179 day time deposits by a total of $76.7 million
without increasing their required reserves.”
Several of the 53 banks in the Eighth District with
average reserve requirements on their time deposits
above 3 percent have limited incentives to lengthen
the maturity structure of their time deposits because
of the 3 percent minimum rule. Suppose these banks
lengthened the maturity of their
time deposits by shifting 30-179
day deposits to maturities of 4
years and over. Total required
reserves on time deposits would
be reduced to the minimum 3
percent for 13 of these 53 banks
with less than 10 percent reduc-
tions in their 30-179 day deposits.
Required reserves for 8 of these
13 banks would hit the 3 percent
minimum with less than 5 percent reductions in the
30-179 day deposits.
In the aggregate, however, the percentage of time
deposits in 30-179 day maturities at Eighth District
member banks is likely to decline. Banks with in-
centives to reduce their short-term deposits are gen-
erally larger than the banks with incentives to in-
crease. As one possible response, suppose that the 53
banks in the District with average reserve require-
inents on time deposits over 3 percent reduce their
30-179 day deposits by 10 percent or until the 3 per-
cent minimum rule is reached, whichever comes first.
In addition, the 27 banks with incentives to shift
deposits to short maturities do so by the maximum
amount without increasing their required reserves.
These reactions would generate a net decrease of
$117.9 million in 30-179 day deposits. Also note that
banks with incentives to lengthen the maturity of
their time deposits will tend to complete their adjust-
ment to the recent changes in reserve requirements
faster than banks with incentives to shorten, since
short-term deposits can be converted to long-term
deposits faster than long-term deposits can be con-
verted to short-term.
SUMMARY
In October 1975 and January 1976 the Federal
Reserve Board lowered reserve requirements on time
deposits with maturities of over 179 days to induce
member banks to lengthen the maturity structure of
their time deposits. The effectiveness of these policy
actions is limited by a constraint on the reduction
in reserve requirements: a member bank’s required
3 percent to 1 percent), 16 banks in the Eighth District
had incentives to shift deposits to short maturities. With
the second change (reserve requirements on 180 day -
4 year deposits lowered from 3 percent to 2.5 percent),
11 more banks were given such incentives. Those first 16
banks could shift a total of $46 million isi 180 day - 4 year
deposits to maturities of 30-179 days without increasin
their required reserves under the first change, and coul
shift $62.8 million to 30-179 day maturities without increas-
ing their required reserves when the second change is added.
Tobie ID
PERCENTAGES BY WHICH EIGHTh DISTRIa MEMBER BAr~WS
Ct. 4 SHIFT TIME DEPOSITS TO SHORT MATURITIES WITHOUT
INCREASING REQU!RED RESERVES
Maximum Percentage lncreoic~;r. 30~ 179 Day Time Deposi’s
Thai V/sir Nat incre~seRequired Reserves
0.19% i0%-2C% 20%.3C% 200/0 50% 30%.100% Over 00°/s
,i.jr.h.. Bopk~ 55437
I:: s:.i~.,c-’~ii.r iI’,r’ins~. li_I Ii sIn’ .):ii.it,s.._ ,icr’’ss~t.I 9’. s~..Uc:—ik !.‘s’.’ stay i~tit’ di~55’.i.it,.
i,s*tl ,iin,’u’i1~.
“Limiting the analysis to only those banks with over $5
million in 30-179 day deposits may understate the number
of banks with incentives to increase their short-tenn de-
posits under the new reserve requirements. Suppose that in
October 1975 some banks would have preferred to have
more than $5 million in 30-179 day deposits if there had
been no penalty on those deposits, but they reduced their
30-179 day deposits to below $5 million in response to the
penalty. Those banks could shift some of their longer-term
deposits to short maturities, bringing their 30-179 day de-
posits to over $5 million, without increasing their required
reserves, If there were such banks, they would have tended
to keep their 30-179 day deposits just below $5 million
before the recent changes in reserve requirements. In the
week ending October 22, 1975, 6 member banks in the
Eighth District had between $4.75 and $5 million in 30-179
day deposits, and 3o fthose banks had between $4.9 and
$5 million, Some of these banks may have incentives to
increase their short-term deposits under the new reserve
requirements,
“The reserve requirement reduction in January 1976 Increased
the number of banks with incentives to shift deposits to short
maturities above the number given such incentives by the
policy action in October 1975 alone. With only the first re-
duction in reserve requirements (reserve requirements on
deposits with maturities of 4 years or more reduced from
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reserves on time deposits can be no less than 3 per-
cent of its total time deposits. Banks with less than
$5 million in 30-179 day time deposits are not af-
fected by these changes in reserve requirements;
most member banks are in this category. Among the
larger member banks, some have incentives to
lengthen the maturity structure of their time deposits
under the new reserve requirements, and others are
given incentives to shorten. In the Eighth Federal
Reserve District, only about one-fifth of the member
banks are affected by these recent policy actions,
and about one-third of the larger banks which are
affected have incentives to shorten the maturity struc-
ture of their time deposits.
APPENDIX
Table A-I illustrates conditions under which a bank
would shorten the maturity structure of its time de-
posits in response to the recent change in reserve
requirements. A hypothetical member bank has $100
million in time and savings deposits throughout the
discussion.t The behavior of the bank is analyzed as
though both of the recent changes in reserve require-
ments went into effect at the same time. This ap-
proach avoids analyzing effects of the reserve require-
ment changes separately. In December 1974 the bank
had $25 million in 30-179 day time deposits, but by
the time the recent changes in reserve requirements
were imposed, it had reduced its 30-179 day time
deposits to $15 million because of the 6 percent re-
serve requirement, while increasing time deposits with
maturities between 180 days and 4 years by $10 mil-
lion. Applying the new reserve requirements to each
category of time and savings deposits would indi-
cate required reserves of only $2775 million, which
~This discussion abstracts from the effects that changes
in reserve requirements have on total deposits. To illus-
trate such an effect, with the time and savings deposits
held by the hypothetical bank in Table A-I as of October
1975, the bank’s required reserves on time and savings
deposits declined from $3.3 million to $3 million when
reserve requirements were changed. The bank could have
expanded its deposits with the reserves that were freed
by the reduction in reserve requirements. In the illustra-
tion in Table A-I total time and savings deposits are held
constant and reserves changed because the issue investi-
gated in this note is the effect of changes in reserve
reo~uirementson the maturity distribution of time deposits
and not effects on excess reserves and deposit expansion.
Effects on the maturity distribution of time deposits are
probably easier to understand if total deposits are held
constant and their maturity distribution changed than if
reserves were held constant, and total deposits and their
maturity distribution changed.
would be only 2.775 percent of total time and savings
deposits [see column (3)]. However, because of the
3 percent minimum rule, the bank’s actual required
reserves on time and savings deposits would be $3
million.
The responses of banks to the recent reserve re-
quirement changes depend upon such influences as
the maturity preferences of banks for deposits and the
changing pattern of interest rates on time deposits
of various maturities. Therefore, the actual response
of a bank with a maturity distribution of deposits like
that of the hypothetical bank in Table A-I is uncertain,
Nevertheless, such banks have incentives to shift some
of their deposits to short maturities, and the two pos-
sible responses illustrated in columns (4) and (6) of
Table A-I indicate the types of adjustments such banks
are likely to make in the maturity distribution of their
time deposits.
In the first possible adjustment, the bank shifts
$6.45 million of its 180 day - 4 year deposits to maturi-
ties of 30-179 days. This is the maximum such change
in maturities the bank can make without increasing
its required reserves [see column (5) of Table A-I].
Note that in this first adjustment the hypothetical
bank has still not restored its short-term time deposits
to the level desired before the penalty was imposed
on those deposits ($25 million in 30-179 day deposits).
As illustrated in columns (6) and (7) of Table A-I, the
bank can restore its short-tenn deposits to that de-
sired level without increasing its required reserves if
it also shifts $8.33 million from 180 day - 4 year de-
posits to deposits with maturities of 4 years and over.
WIth short-term deposits of $25 million and long-term
deposits of $18.33 million, required reserves would
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able A-I
CHANGES iN TH COMPOSITION OF T ME AND SAVINGS DEPOS T$
AT A HYPOTHETICAL SANK
(Dollo Amounts ln MillIons)
1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 16) 17)
When New Calculated Cekulo ha Calculated
Reserve Required Require Requsred
Require Reserves, First Reserves Second Reserves
Types o December men Eased 0,, Ad
1
ust- Eased On Adiust Eased On
Deposits 1974’ mposed Column (2)’ ,nent
4
Column (4) ment’ Column (6)’




30 79 days $25 $15 (03) $5 (06) $ 2145 (03 X$5 $ 25.00 (03)X$5
X $10$0.750 + 1 06) X (06) X
$16.45=$1 137 $20 $1 350
180 days
four years $ 55 $ 65 (025) X $65$l 625 $ 58.55 (025 X $ 46 67 (.025) X
$58 55—’$1.463 $4667 $L167
Fauryearsandqver $ 10 $ 0 (01) 1(510 $0.100 $ 1000 (01)11 $ 18.33 (01)11
$10$0100 $1833 $0183
$100 $100 $2,775 $100.00 $3,000 $10000 $3000
MINIMUM REQUiRED RESERVES $3 $3 $3
mm I the me sty di tribution o Ui hypothetical Ii n ‘ ep ts a o December 197 be o e he ban had Em to a in t the matmu-,ty
of its eposst to tb cli ngeiarese e uire,nen tha n into effect u nyth tin th
~Tlnsmatunty d at din ion of deposits reliecta adjuatmen oU ibank to the mae requirement changes , December 1974 but before ad.
atinenta a ad in respan e to th ate reqoiremen changes in October 1975 and January 1976.
‘Calculated ese v based upon reserve requirements In effec noe January 8 1976
4 Ii ftsn 80 day 4 year deposits to maturities of 0-179 dy scurt I caleni t d qi.nrad reserves equal S peroen oftotal line and sa
deposits Thi is Ui maximum if 180 Ca 4 year deposit to mater tea a 30-179 day that does not increase required rese es
~Sb tiny 180 day 4 year depceis to inatu ti of 0-179 days an 4yass or ove such hat the 80-179 day depos ta are a Ui I el Ii for
th penalty was imposed o 80.179 day deposits while Is ~n requ red rea as on tOne and ssvmga deposits at th m,nlmnm Ii pe cent
still be $3 million. In this second possible adjustment maturities that keep required reserves unchanged in-
the bank would increas it 30-179 day deposits by volve greater shifts to long maturities than to short
$10 million. This is more than the $8.33 million increase maturitie . Therefore, the effect of the recent reserve
in its deposits with maturities of y ars and o\ei. I os - requirement change on the average maturIty of time
ever other cases can be constructed in which the d posits for the type of bank represented in Table
combination of lifts in deposits to short and long A is uncertain.
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